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ABSTRACT 
We  study  an  adverse  selection  model,  with  a  principal  and  several  agents,  where 
contracting is under  asymmetric information. The number  of  agents is finite and  types are 
"continuous" and  independent.  We analyze two  settings. In  the  first one,  the performance 
functions of  mechanisms may  depend  on  al1 the  reported  types.  In  the  second  one,  each 
performance function depends only on the respective announced type. 
Under the standard hypotheses in the basic one-agent adverse selection model and the 
independence  assumption,  there  is  not  loss  of  generality  if  the  principal  considers  only 
mechanisms for which every agent reports his trne type as a dominant strategy. We  consider also 
the relaxation of the monotonicity hypothesis about the agents' welfare and we will prove that 
the former "equivalente" behveen  the Bayesian implementation and the dominant strategy one 
stands firm in some cases. 
We examine the properties of the optimal mechanism, supposing that the principal's 
"virtual  income"  depends  on  the  agents'  performances  only  through  the  aggregate  total 
performance (which is natural in the context of regulation of a good produced by an oligopoly), 
and also, assuming the frame of regulation of a iiionopolist with several independent divisions 
(or the one of a group of firms), each one producing a different good. 
Unlike the standard properties of the optimal mechmisiiis in the basic one-agent adverse 
selection model, in our model the optimal mechanism  may  ask very efficient agents  for an 
individual performance higher than the one of  complete information. 
We show also that if agents are symmetrical, the principal may prefer ex ante to hire 
more than one agent. 
Keywords: Adverse Selection; Independent Types; Optimal Mechanisms. 1.- INTRODUCTION 
This paper aims at analyzing the adverse selection relationship of a principal with several 
agents. An  example is the Japanese automobile km: Japanese management made much less 
extensive use of competitive  bidding that the U.S. management [see Milgrom & Roberts (1992), 
chapter 161. We can also think about the internal structure of a firm whose head office is related 
to severai divisions. Our approach may also represent the regulation of an oligopoly producing 
a homogeneous good or the one of a monopoly with several divisions (or the one of a group of 
firms), each one producing a different good. 
We study an adverse selection model, with  a principal and  several agents, where the 
"type" of  each agent is only known by  himself before contracting. The number of agents is 
finite and types are  independent realizations of  absolutely continuous random variables with 
sbictly positive density functions. 
The utility function of each agent is quasilinear and separable. It is the addition of three 
terms: his remuneration, a personalized function clustering externalities which are originated by 
agent's  actions, and a disutility (or utility) depending only on his type and on his individual 
action  (performance).  The  principal's  utility  function  is  the  difference between  a  profit, 
depending on agent's actions and types, and the sum of payments multiplied by  a parameter 
representing principal's preferences on the agents' welfare. 
We consider two settings. In the first one, individual performance functions depend on 
every reported type and in the second one, each individual performance function is only based 
on the type announced by the respective agent. We are interested in the properties of optimal 
performances and in the principal's ex ante preferences on the agents' number. 
Model  and results. 
Our first setting represents sitiiations where an economic agent (the principal) proposes 
personalized  take-it-or-leave-it  "prices"  and  "quantities"  to  another  agents,  so  that  each 
individual "menu" of  contracts depends on every announced type.  Think of  a producer,  of  a 
variable quality good, being ignorant of the consumers' preferences upon the quality, or a firm 
purchasing an input, which is unfamiliar with the suppliers' productivity. Such menu of contracts 
may  represent  also,  for  example,  several  classes  of  managerial  compensations  in  some 
enterprises [see the chapter 13 of Milgrom & Roberts (1992)l. 
We will make assumptions warranting that there is not loss of generality if the principal 
considers oniy mechanisms for which reporting the true type is a dominant strategy for each agent. The proof of this "equivalence", between the Bayesian implementation and the dominant 
strategy one, is realized by  sliowing that the two of the respective optimization programs are 
equivalent  to  the  "virtual" program  consisting in  the  maximization  of  a  distortion  of  the 
principal's  expected utility  of  complete information, taking  into account  the  social cost  of 
revelation of the agents' hidden information. 
We prove  also that  this equivalence stands firm,  in  some cases,  when  each agent's 
welfare is not  monotonous in his type.  Nevertheless,  in  this case,  there is two  classes of 
distortions in the principal's expected utility and the optimal mechanism may ask different types 
for the same performance (bunching). 
For our fust setting, we examine the properties of the optimal mechanism considering 
three cases. In both two fnst cases we suppose that the principal's "virtual income" '  depends 
on the agents'  performances only through the aggregate total performance (this is natural, for 
example, in the frame of  the regulation of a homogeneous good). 
In the first case [Linear Case],  we assume that each agent's utility depends linearly on 
his type  (in the frame of the regulation of a homogeneous good, this case represents that every 
firm  has  a  constant marginal production cost).  We prove  that,  under  some conditions,  the 
principal prefers to offer direct dominant strategy mechanisms such that only the most virtually 
efficient agents  (generically  only  one) produce.  Moreover,  if  agents  are symmetrical,  the 
principal may prefer ex ante to hire more than one agent because the expected efficiency of the 
virtually best agent increases with the agents' number. 
For this Linear Case, if agents are symmetrical, the properties of optimal performances 
are similar to those of the basic one-agent model: Although they are discontinuous, the aggregate 
total  performance  is  monotonous  and  each  individual  performance is  monotonous  in  the 
respective agent's type. Moreover each individual performance is lower than the one of complete 
information. Nevertheless, if the agents' ex ante distributions of types are different, the optimal 
mechanism  may  ask an agent, with  a  null performance under  complete information,  for a 
positive performance: virtual efficiencies induce an "order" over agents which may be different 
to the one induced by efficiencies. 
In the second case [Convex Case], agents are symmetrical and each agent's type enters 
into the respective utility function affecting its third term which is a strictly convex (or concave 
if it represents  a profit) function in  his performance (in the frame of  the regulation of  an 
' It  is  the principal's  virtual  utility  plus  the total  agents'  virtual  cost  [following the terminology o€ 
Myerson (1981)l. 
His type multiplies his action in his utility function. homogeneous  good,  this  case  represents  that  each  firm  has  a  strictly increasing  marginal 
production cost). Although the aggregate total performance is lower than the one of  complete 
information, if the set of contractual types is heteroge nwus enough, the optimal mechanism can 
ask the most efficient agents for an  individual performance higher than  the one of  complete 
information. The intuition is that the principal "saves" informational rent of an agent inducing 
the truthful revelation of others agent's types. 
Considering an agents' quadratic disutility function we prove that, for the Convex Case, 
the principal may also prefer ex ante to hire more than one agent. 
In the third case, we examine the regulation of a monopolist with  several independent 
divisions (or the one of a group of  firms), each one producing a different good. Considering a 
cuadratic surplus and assuming that each type is the constant marginal cost of each division (or 
fum), we prove that, when goods are substitutes, the optimai regulatory mechanism may ask the 
most efficient divisions (or firms) for an individual production higher than the one of complete 
information. Nevertheless, when goods are complements, every individual production is lower 
than the one of complete information. 
In our second setting, feasible mechanisms have each individual performance function 
based only on the announced type by the respective agent. This is justified if two circumstances 
coincide: on the one hand, if only contracts depending on the agents'  (verifiable) performances 
are feasible and  on the other hand  [like in Demski & Sappington (1984)],  if each  agent's 
performance depends only on both an individual state (type) and a hidden action, in  such a way 
that the state is privately observed by him-self before taking the action. 
We show firstly that if the principal can only propose contracts depending on observed 
performances, the implementation by contracts is equivalent to the one by  direct mechanisms for 
which  each  individual performance  function  is  based  only  on  the  announced  type  of  the 
respective agent. 
Now, the equivalence between the Bayesian implementation and tlie dominant strategy 
one is obtained under less assumptions and the optimal mechanism entails that the most efficient 
agents may  be asked  for individual performances higher  than  the correspondent ones under 
complete information. 
Dzfferences with the previous  research. 
It is known that the basic adverse selection model, with only one agent and a continuum 
of types can be interpreted like the problem of a principai in front of a continuum of agents with independent types [see Guesnerie & Laffont (1984)].  Our model, on the contrary, assumes a 
finite agents' number. 
There are adverse selection models, with several agents, where types are correlated [see, 
for example, Demski & Sappington (1984) and Cremer & McLean (1988)l. The main conclusion 
is that the principal is able to exploit the information owned by each agent about rival types 
(correlation) and he implements optimally the complete information solution. On  the contrary, 
we suppose type-independence and this implies that al1 agent will obtain an informational rent 
and that the complete information mechanism cannot be the solution of incomplete information. 
Note that in our model there is not an initial auction like, for example, in Laffont & 
Tirole (1987) who analyze the problem where several firms may carry out an indivisiblepublic 
project having a large value for consumers. Under asymmetrical information they characterize 
the optimal Bayesian auction and prove that it can  be implemented by  a  dominant strategy 
auction. In our model, the principal contracts several agents withoiit utilizing a mechanism to 
select one agent. As mentioned above, an example of this class of relationship is the Japanese 
automobile firtn. We can also think about the internal structure of a firm or about the regulation 
of an oligopoly. 
Mookherjee & Reichelstein's  (1992) analyze a general agency model, with a principal 
and several agents with independent types, and they prove that, the above equivalence between 
the Bayesian  implementation  and  the  dominant  strategy  one holds  under  some  conditions. 
Nevertheless, their model can not be applied, for example, in the setting of the regulation of a 
private good, because the utility which they assume for their agents does not take into account 
the agent's externalities. 
Our analysis proves that the equivalence between the Bayesian implementation and the 
dominant strategy one can be extended to another frames as regulation. 
We consider also the relaxation of the monotonicity hypothesis upon the agents' welfare 
[implicitly  supposed  by  Mookherjee  & Reichelstein  (1992)l  and  we  will  prove  that  the 
equivalence stands firm in some cases. 
Lewis & Sappington (1989) analyze the regulation of a monopolist with a production 
costs function which  is not monotonous in  type. They prove that the monopolist may prefer 
understate or overstate his type and that the optimal mechanism may ask for a performance with 
bunching. We consider also such a relaxation,  with  a cost function more general than  the one 
supposed by Lewis & Sappington (1989). We prove that the equivalence, between the Bayesian 
implementation and the dominant strategy one, stands firm under hypothesis which are natural 
in  the frame of regulation of the industrial pollution of a group of firms. 
Structure of  the paper. 
The paper  is organized  as  follows: Section  1 sets up  the general  model.  Section 2 
analyzes the equivalence between the Bayesian implementation and the dominant strategy one 
in our first setting. Section 3 explores the relaxation of the monotonicity hypothesis upon the 
agents' welfare. Section 4 analyzes the Linear Case, the Convex case and the regulation case. 
Finally, Section 5 explores our second setting. 2.- GENERAL FORMULATION 
We consider a principal hinng n agents. 
The agent i's utility function (i=l,.  .  ,n) is: 
where  x=(x,, ...,x,,)  E  lRn+  is  the  vector  of  agents'  verifiable performances (actions),  the 
parameter  is the agent i's type and s indicates his remuneration. 
We suppose the following separability assumption. We will consider two versions to 
cover more cases. 
Se~arable  Utííity (SU) 
Vi(x,OJ  = Ri(x) - vi(xi,OJ  V i  =  1,.  .  .  ,n.  (SU-) 
Vi(x,0i)=Ri(x)+vi(xi,03Vi=1  ,...,  n  (SU+) 
The principal's utility function is: 
where 8 =(8,, .  .  .  ,O,)  E 8:  = IIBi is the vector of contractual types and h  2 O represents the 
principal's preferences on the agents' welfare. The parameter h may also be the shadow cost of 
publics funds in the regulation setting. 
In order to fix ideas, let us consider several specifications of  the model. 
i) If the principal was a producer of a variable quality good, we should have A =  1,  Ri E  0, 
B(x,%)  = - C(x), where C(-) would be the cost function. Type Oi ,  in SU+, would measure the 
for good of  quality xi. 
ii) If the principal was a firm purchasing an  input, we should have A= 1, R,  =O,  B(x,B) 
= [P(Cxi)-c]  Cx,  , where P(-) would be the inverse demand  function and  c  would  be  the 
marginal cost. Type Oi,  in SU-, would be the supplier i's cost parameter and si would be the 
price for the quantity xi  bought to supplier i. iii) In the case of the regulation of a private good, the regulator's utility function would 
be the sum of the consumers' net  surplus plus the firms'  total profit weighed with  1-A, where 
AE[O,l]: 
The function v,(.  , .)  would be the firm k's production cost, the consumers' gross surplus would 
be  represented  by  S(Q) =  P(q)dq and  P(.)  would  denote  the  inverse  demand  function.  1 
Morwver R,(x)=P(C  xi)xk ,  and therefore: B(x,@)  = S(C xi) - A P(C xi) C x,  - (1-A) C vk(x,,O&. 
iv) For the regulation of a monopoly with several independent divisions (or of a group 
of  firms), each one producing a different private good, the objective function of government 
would be: 
where S(.) would be the consumers' gross surplus,  P,(.  )=axkS(.) would be the price of the 
good k and v (-  ,  S)  would be the firm k's production cost. According to our formulation, we 
should have 
We assume that  types  are independent realizations of  absolutely continuous random 
variables with density and distribution functions denoted respectively by $(O,) and Fi(Oi), 8,E e,, 
with $(S)  >O, i=  1,. .  .  ,n. Each agent, before contracting, observes privately his type realization. 
For  each  agent  i, let  E'{.} denote the  expectation  with  regard  to  the  random  vector  8. 
¡: =(Oi,.  .  .  ,0i.,,8i+l,. .  .  ,8J.  From the revelation principie [see, for instance, Myerson (1982)l we 
know that the principal wiil offer a direct revelation mechanism that induces truthful revelation 
of the agents' types. Such mechanisms are based on the vector of announced types O =(Ol,. .  .  ,8,J 
E 8: =iIei  and they will be denoted: We assume that  the transfer  functions t(.)  and  the performance functions  x(.) are 
bounded and continuously differentiable functions aimost everywhere. Note that they can be 
discontinuous 3.  Por the second  setting we  will  assume moreover that  the component  %(S) 
i=  1,.  .  .  ,n of al1 feasible vector of performances x( S) depends only on 0 in 0. 
The optimai mechanism has to solve the following program BP: 
mgrarn  (BP) 
max  E{ B(x(B),B) - A  C 4(R) ) 
x(.>,t(.) 
s.t. 
0, E  ar  max E'{  t,(e,,ej  + vi(x(O,,8j,oi) )  8 
vO,,  vi 
The probleiii  would  be  simplified  if  we  could  replace  the  self-selection  Bayesian 
constraints (1) by the correspondent ones of the dominant strategy implementation. In that case, 
the principal would solve the program: 
Dominant strateey vroeram (DP) 
max  E{  B(x(B),B) - A  C ti(@)  ) 
x(.),t(.) 
s.t. 
0, E  ar rnax  ti(0,,8i) + V,(X(R,,~,),O,)  }  VO,,  vB.,,  vi  6 
(2) 
Constraints (2) point out that the mechanism induces truthful revelation of types like a 
dominant strategy for agents. An additional advantage of the dominant strategy implementation 
is that it may mitigate the problem of  multiple equilibria. 
Similarly, let BP'  and DP'  denote the programs for the second setting. 
In the case of only one agent, under weak  assumptions. the must be continuous at the optimum [see 
Guesnerie & Laffont (1984)J. 2.- THJ3 EQUIVALENCE OF IMPLEMENTATIONS IN THE FlRST SETTING 
In this section we will extend the Mookherjee & Reichelstein's (1992) analysis showing 
that the programs BP and DP are equivalent. 
They  consider the case Vi@,OJ = - vi(h,(j),OJ,  where  yEY represents  the  general 
decision to be implemented and h,(y)E B  vi, with a principal's utility equal to B@)-E$. On the 
contrary, we assume the utiiity function of each agent being given by two personalized functions 
(see assumption SU). The fust one, Ri(.), gathers together the agents'  externalities and the 
second  one,  vi(-,  e),  represents a  personalized  cost  (or profit)  depending on  type  and  on 
individual action. Moreover,  in our model the equivalence would stand if we snpposed a bit 
more general setting with: 
We will prove the equivalence through  the virtual program  (VP). We consider  two 
versions corresponding to assumptions SU- and SU+. 
where O(. ,  S) is defined, under SU-, as 
and, under SU + ,  as 
Let us give an  explanation of  the virtual program. Firstly, note that, under complete 
information and when individual performances can depend on the whole vector of types (first 
setting), the principal solves, for each O,  the following program: 
Comvlete information DroEram  (CIP) 
max ( B(x,O)  + A C Vi(x,O) - A C ui ] 
X Therefore,  the virtual program is a distortion of the one which  he would solve if tlie 
information was complete. Under SU-, the term 
is added. For see that this term represents the social cost of revelation of the hidden information, 
assume that both the disutiíity and the marginal disutility of each agent increase with his type. 
As it is better for the principal that the most  efficient agents being asked for a performance 
grater than the one for other less efficient agents, each agent has a natural incentive for overstate 
his me. Therefore,  in order that an  agent i of  type Qi-dQi  does not report  Qi,  he has  to be 
compensated with  anyi(n,,OJd#,. The principal  weighs the previous compensation with  Fi(QJ 
which is the "amount" of the agent i's types that can claim to be of  type Qi. 
kt  r(?)  denote the optimal value of  the program Y.  In this section we assume the 
existence of  solutions of every program. 
Firstly,  we prove that if  a  mechanism  solves  BP,  it has  to  verify,  as  in  the  basic 
one-agent adverse selection model, self-selection local incentive constraints and this implies that 
the principal's optimal expected utility is lower than the optimal value of  VP, which takes in 
account the social cost of the hidden information. 
Proposition 1  Under SU we have i'(BP)  I r(VP). 
Proof: Suppose SU-. The line of argument is similar to the one of the case n= l.  Let [t(-),x(.)] 
a solution of the program BP.  The functions 
are continuously differentiable almost everywhere. From (1) we have: 
and, under assumption SU-, we get: 
¿~,,F[U~(@.~,@J]  = -  Ei[anyi(xi(0.,,Bj)] a.e. on Oi,  Vi Therefore, integrating we have that 
where iii = Ei[ui(O.i,Oi)] 2 ui vi. By  (3) and (4) the following equality holds: 
Integrating by parts the second term in (5),  and substituting it into (5)  we obtain: 
Then, if [t(.),x(-)]  is a solution of BP we have that 
r@P) = E{B(x(B),B)  - X C 4(0)}  5  E[  0-(x(@),O)  ] 5 T(VP-). 
Under assumption SU +  ,  the equality 
Sacondly, we will prove that every solution of  VP is dominant strategy implementable, 
under some conditions that we specify below: 
Monotone hazard rate (MHR) 
F (-)/f  (S)  is increasing vi.  (MHR-) 
[l-F (-)]/f  (a)  is decreasing Vi.  (MHR+) Constant sirrn (CS) 
axTe,v,(-,  S) >  O  and axb,vi(.  ,  .)  is increasing  in O,,  vi  (CS-) 
a,,r.(. ,  .)  >  O  and azcevi(.  ,  -)  is decreasing in 0,  vi  (CS+) 
Monotone asents' welfare (MAW) 
a,vi(-;)r0  Vi 
Let us comment the above assumptions which are standard in the basic one-agent adverse 
selection model. 
Assumption MHR- is satisfied by most usual distributions and it implies the existence of 
a  sort of  decreasing returns for the probability that  there are  "improvements" on the basic 
technology  (measured  by  8-0 when  the  parameter  fl  represents  the  productivity)  [see  the 
interpretation of  assumption in chapter 1 of  Laffont & Tirole (1993)l. Note that assumptions 
MHR- and MHR+  are equivalent when density functions are symmetrical. 
Assumptions MHR and CS, for only one agent, guarantee that the principal's program 
can  be relaxed  removing  self-selection  constraints.  [see,  for instance, Fudenberg  & Tirole 
(1991)l. On the one hand, assumption CS implies the equivalence between constraints and the 
monotonicity of the performance function and, on the other hand, adding assurnption MHR we 
get that every solution of the "relaxed program" is monotone.  If MHR fails, the solution of 
relaxed program may be not monotone appearing bunching: the optimal performance is constant 
on an interval of positive measure. This makes the anaiysis difficult. For our model, with several 
agents, assumptions MHR and CS imply (assuming a last condition bellow) that each optimal 
individual performance of the program VP is monotone in the respective agent's type. Therefore 
every  solution of VP  is dominant strategy implementable. Knowing if the equivalence holds 
when MHR fails, is an open problem. 
Assumption MAW [implicitly supposed in Mookherjee & Reichelstein (1992)l facilitates 
greatly the analysis. It implies that each agent's  expected utility is monotone in his type and 
thus, the set of individual rationality constraints can be substituted, without loss of generality, 
for only one constraint. When there is only one agent, if MAW fails, he can have an incentive 
to understate his type for some of  its realizations,  and overstate it for others  [see Lewis & 
Sappington (1989)l. This leads to bunching despite assumption MHR. In Section 3 we show that 
assumption MAW may be leave out, for some cases, holding up the equivalence between BP and 
DP . 
The last assumption which we consider is: Indevendent-on-tyves virtual income (ITVI) 
The function W(x,8) does not depend on 8 
where, under SU-, we define W(-,  e) as 
and under SU+, we define it as 
W'(x,O)  = B(x,B) + E [  A Ri(x) + (A-1) vi(xi,  O,) 1. 
With regad to assumption ITVI, the utility function of prograin VP- can be rewritten 
n-(x,e) = W(X,B)  - E yi(xi,03  - A E 
where the function 
is, following the terminology of Myerson  (1981), the agent i's virtual cost. According to this 
terminology, W(- ,  .)  represents the principal's  "virtual income". Note that with A= 1, the value 
W(. ,  S) is the principal's income when he retains the agents' externalities that will be sent back 
through transfers. 
Assumption ITVI suffices to apply a revealed preference axgument showing that each 
component of any solution x(.)  of program VP is monotone in the respective type. 
Note that  for the examples of  the producer of  a variable quality  good and  the firm 
purchasing input, we have Ri= O,  A =  1 and therefore ITVI holds. For the example of regulation 
it is also satiskd because W 3 S. 
Proposition 2 Under SU, MHR, CS, ITVI, every solution of program VP is dominant strategy 
implementable. If moreover MAW holds, we have i'(VP) I  i'@P). 
Proof: Consider firstly assumption SU-. Let x(.)  be a solution of program VP. Then it has to 
solve the pointwise maximization of  the function 0-(x,8). Let  see that  this implies xi(8,,@J 
decreasing in  O,,  for each i. Consider i and Bi  < di .  Adding up inequalities: 
and under ITVI-, we get where 
Under assumptions MHR-  and  CS- the function a,y,(. ,  S)  is strictly increasing in OEe,, and 
therefore, we have a,[  y,(-  ,8~  - y,(- ,O,) ]  > O. The inequality (6)  implies, then, xi(0,,8J  2  xi(B- 
¡,ej. 
Because the Spence-Mirrlees' condition holds (it is the first condition in  CS-) and the 
function xi(04,03 is decreasing in 0, for each O,,  we can apply the habitual line of argument for 
the one-agent  adverse selection models to prove that  xi(O,, .)  is implementable by  a transfer 
function <(B.¡,  m).  Define 
where fii is arbitrary. From CS- we deduce 
So,  the mechanism  [t(.),x(.)] satisfies the  constraints  (2) and  therefore,  x(-)  is dominant 
strategy implementable. 
If  moreover MAW  holds,  choosing 0, = ui  vi,  the previous  mechanism  [t(.),x(.)] 
verifies the individual rationality constraints (it is feasible for DP) and further we have 
If we assume SU+, making use of a similar argument, we obtain that x(.)  must satisfy: 
where now 
1  -F.(B) 
yi(~,e):  =v,(x,~)  -~-a,?,(~,e)  x so,  B  €6, 
A(@) 
18 verifies  ax[ri(. $2-y¡(.  ,831  < O  by  MHR+  and  CS+.  Therefore,  in  this  case,  is 
increasing in  0, for each O,  and x(-)  is dominant strategy implementable using 
Because  the  dominant  strategy  implementation implies  the  Bayesian  one,  previous 
propositions prove immediately that al1 the three programs BP, DP and VP are equivalent. 
Proposition 3  Under assumptions SU, MHR, CS, ITVI, MAW, we have i'(BP)  = r@P) = 
i'(VP),  that is, every solution [t( -),x(.)] of program BP is dominant strategy implementable 
with transfer functions i(.)  satisfying 
E'[ t(O,,Oi)  - ti(O,,@J ] = O ve, vi. 
Let us conclude this section with the following remark. When X=O  programs VP and CIP 
coincide and the complete information solution is the solution of incomplete information, under 
assumptions of Proposition 3. This is a property of the basic one-agent adverse selection model 
[see Guesnerie & Laffont (1984) and Caiilaud, Guesnene, Rey & Tirole (1988)l. 3.- RELAXATION OF MONOTONE AGENTS'  WELFARE ASSUMPTION 
IN THE FIRST SETTING 
We have indicated previously that, in the basic  one-agent adverse selection model,  if 
MAW fails, the agent can prefer to understate or overstate his type [see Lewis & Sappington 
(1989)l.  This  implies,  in  spite  of  assumption  MHR,  that  the  optimal  performance  has 
"bunching  " . 
In this section we will see that it is possible to relax assumption MAW, in some cases, 
maintaining the equivalence between BP and DP. Unlike Lewis & Sappington's (1989) analysis, 
we consider several agents with more general disutility functions. We will assume: 
Tvpe-se~arable  disutility (TSD) 
For every i, vi(x,O) = O (oi(x) + ?¡(O),  x 2 0, O  E 9, ,  where (oi(.), 'Pi(.) are 
continuously differentiable. 
Assumption TSD, which generalizes a constant marginal disutility, implies a necessary 
and sufficient condition for Bayesian implementation. But such condition does not involve that 
each individual performance is monotone in the respective type. 
Proposition 4 Under SU- and TSD, the transfer functions t(.) Bayesian implement x(.) if and 
only if the following conditions are satisfied: 
(a)  There are values íii, i=  l,..  .,n, such that, for each i, the following equality holds 
almost everywhere in Oi: 
@)  The function Eipi[xi(R.i, .)] is decreasing (in 6'3  Vi. 
Proof: Given t(-)  implementing x(-),  applying the argument in the proof of Proposition 1, we 
obtain the equalities in (a). On the other hand, with a revealed preference argument as in the 
proof of Proposition 2, we get: (~,-R~)E~~~[x~(o.~,o~)]  =(8i-0~~ipi[xi(~.,Bi)],  di,  VRi,  Vi, and then, 
the function Eivi[xi(O,, e)]  is decreasing for each i. Finally, if t(-),  x(.),  satisfy conditions (a) and  @)  we have vai, vOi, vi, 
and therefore, t(.) implements x(.).  O 
Proposition 4 characterizes, in a special case (TSD), the class of Bayesian implementable 
performance functions, which contains the one of dominant strategy implementable  performance 
functions. Note that, under the conditions of Proposition 3, every solution of PB belongs to the 
latest class. Under SU- and TSD, Proposition 4 implies that the program BP is equivalent to the 
following one: 
muivalent Bayesian ~robíem  (EBP) 
max T[x(-)] - A E *¡(O+)  - A  fii 
x(.),U  S.t. 
Eipi[xi(Bi,  e)]  decreasing Vi 
Eiqi[xj(O,,~)]dr  +Ti(Bi)  -qi(t)  +ltj 2  O  VOj, Vi 
where the functional TI.]  is defined by 
u<  u, 
ax(-)]:=E[B(x(B),O)  + AC  Ri(x(B))l -AC  OjEi~ilxj(O.j,Oj)l  +  E'P;[X;(O-~,T)I~T  DJ(Oi)dei  1 
Note that if for aii i the inequalities <pi  2  O and qi'  2 O hold, assumption TSD implies 
MAW and the anaiysis of Section 2 is valid. In order to examine the problem when assumption 
MAW fails, we will assume, like in Lewis & Sappington (1989), that each  "fixed cost" \Iri is 
decreasing and concave in the "marginal cost" 8;. Thus, we can  warrant that, for the optimal 
performance, each individual rationaiity constraint is binding at only one value of the respective 
type. 
Lemma 1  Assume SU-, TSD, with qi E C2, qi'  < O, qil'  < O,  & > O,  Vi. Then, for every 
BP-optimal performance function, each individual rationality function is binding at only one 
type. If such types are ri E  O¡,  i=l,  ...,  n, the principal's expected utility is equal to where o,(- ;  e) is defined by: 
F.(@)  1  -F.(@)  pj(O;8J:=B+XI, o  E e,;  P,(Q;B):=O-A-,  e  E e;; 
A(@)  $(O) 
-  - 
and for T~ E int(ei),  @i(B;~J:=@i(O;OJ  if  5  O  < T,,  @i(@;~i):  =@i(O;4)  if  T,  < O  _(  Oi. 
Proof:  Let  x(-) be  an  optimal  performance of  program  EBP.  The  individual rationality 
constraints can be rewritten U,(O,)  2 ui, VO,,  Vi,  where 
Each function U,(-) is continuous and differentiable, with a derivative equal to: 
which is of class C1 almost everywhere [U,'(.)  may be discontinuous because each xi(-) is C' 
almost everywhere].  Since Ei<pi[xi(6,,  S)]  is decreasing and  *,'(m)  is strictly decreasing,  the 
function U;(-)  will  be  strictly  increasing  and  C1 almost  everywhere.  Therefore,  U¡(.)  is 
continuous, C' almost everywhere and strictly convex. As x(.)  is optimal, we obtain that there 
is only one ri E  Qi such that Ui(Oi) 2  U,(TJ = ui ,  V  O,  E ej.  Thus, we have that 
Replacing  these values into the expression of  the principal's  expected utility for the 
program EBP, and after integrating by parts, we get the expression we are Iooking for.  O 
To understand Lemma 1 suppose TSD.  As under  MAW, an agent has  incentives to 
overstate his type, but now a second class of incentives appears: a few efficient agent may prefer 
understate his type, if in that manner the principal believes that this agent has a higher fixed cost 
(note that q;  <O).  Therefore, each agent's rent decreases with his type, when type is low, and it increases  when  type  is  high.  The  principal  will  distort  in  two  fashions  his  complete 
information expected utility: he will add (see Lemma l), for the agent i, the terms 
Note that if ri=Bi  vi holds, only the first class of incentives prevails and the principal's 
expected utility in Lemma  1 coincides with  the virtual function  O(.,  e),  under TSD, in  the 
previous section. 
In  the rest of  this section we wiii see that,  under  the considered assumptions, when 
virtual income is additively separable, concave and increasing in performances and independent 
of types, the programs BP and DP are equivalents. We show also that each optimai individual 
performance depends only on the respective type decreasingly. 
We consider, then,  the following assumption, which is natural if  the principal is the 
owner of a fum with several divisions (agents), each one with the cost function in TSD or if the 
principal is a regulator of the industrial pollution of severa1 firms (here x would be an verifiable 
indicator of contamination with x =  +  ca representing null contamination). 
Indeoendent-on-tvpes  (ITSVI) 
W(x,B)  = C W,(xi), where Wi E CZ,  Wi'  > O,  W,"  5  O,  W,(O)  > -m, vi. 
Under ITSVI, we can easily venfy that the program EBP is equivalent to the independent 
programs EBP,, i =  1,.  .  .  ,n, beiiow . 
Equivalent Bavesian vroeram for agent i (EBPJ 
max 'J?~[X~(.)]  - (1-A) E*,  - A  - A  ui 
x,('),u,  ,  s.t. 
E1<p,[xi(fl.,,  e)]  decreasing 
where The arguments in  the proof of Lemma 1 can be applied for each program EBP,: at the 
optimum of  EBP,,  the  agent i's  rent is  zero  only  for a  certain  type  7,.  We will  see later 
(Proposition 5) that, under some conditions, every solution of EBP, is also a solution of some 
of the programs [P(T,)], 7,  E 9, ,  bellow (precisely the correspondent one of the unique type 
with null rent). 
Note that, if T~ = ,  we consider only the first constraint and if T,  = fi only the second 
one. 
Previously, we establish hypotheses for which any one of the problems [P(TJ] has only 
a solution. Moreover, this solution will be independent on  O.,  and decreasing. In Appendix 1, 
we prove the following lemma. 
Lemma 2  Suppose 
i)  vi E C2,  (O,  1  O,  ~~'(0)  2 O,  V,'(X) > O if x  > O,  <piDi)'l  O 
U)  *, E C2,  *,'  < O,  *,"  < O 
iii)  W, E c2,  ~i>  > O,  ~i>>  5  O,  w,*(o) > re, + i/f,@~l  ~~'(0) 
iv) 1 x',  > O  /  W,(x*J - [8, + h/f,GJ] <pi(x'J  > Wi (O)  - 8, <p,(O) 
$Di(x*J < -*,'(e,  ) 
V)  Wi'(x)/<pi9(x)  for x E ]O,  +m [ is strictly decreasing and it goes to a real  number 
strictly lesser than fi - A/fi(83  when x goes to +m. 
vi)  4 $0  > h 
and moreover MHR+  and MHR-. 
Then, each program [P(T,)] has only one solution: 
where P,(-):  = <p;'[-*:(.)],  and the functions  &(S)  and  $,(S)  are the only ones satisfying - 
Therefore, 4,(.)  and Gi(.) are C' and strictly decreasing functions and they verify si(.) 
< 4,(-). This implies that the solution of [P(TJ] depends only on O,,  is continuous except at most 
at T~,  is decreasing and it may be constant only on a subinte~ai  around T,  and on the rest it is 
continuously differentiable. 
In  Lemma 2, conditions i) and ii) imply that, under SU- and TSD, the disutilities v (e, .) 
vi satisfy SC- but they do not verify MAW.  Condition iv) altows to assure that each solution 
of [P(q)] is strictly positive. The existence and uniqueness are ohtained from iii) and v). 
By means of Lemmas 1  and 2 we can prove that, in some cases, the assumption MAW 
may be relaxed preserving I'(BP) =I'(DP). 
Proposition  5  Under SU-, TSD,  ITSVI and  the assumptions of Lemma 2, every  optimal 
performance of program BP is dominant strategy implementable and r(BP)=r(DP). 
Proof: Let x(  e) be an optimal performance of EBP. From ITSVI each xi(.) is a solution of EBP, 
and, by Lemma 1, there are T~ E ei,  i=l,  ...,  n, such that each xi(.)  is feasible for the program 
[P(T~)]  with an objective value equal to 
Suppose that xi(.) is not a solution of [P(TJ]. From Lemma 2, the only solution q(-  ;TJ 
of  p(7,)] has to satisfy: 
We know that X,(-;T,)  is a function independent of types O,,  decreasing and continuous, 
and piecewise continuously differentiable. Therefore, the function 
is continuous, piecewise continuous differentiable, and strictly couvex. Moreover, we have: Then, we get Ui(OJ  2  Ui(rJ, Vei€ €4.  Considering íii = ui - U,(rJ we obtain [xi(.;rJ,fii]  which 
is feasible for the program EBPi, with an objective function value equal to 
which is strictly greater than the one of  xi(.), contradicting that we have supposed xi(-)  being 
a solution of EBP,. 
Necessarily, the function xi(.) is a solution of [P(ri)] and it is, then, independent on types 
Bi, decreasing and dominant strategy implementable. O 
The intuition of  the above results is the following. Hypotheses  of  separabiríty  and 
type-independence allow to separate the agents' incentives: at the optimuin, each agent is asked 
for a performance depending only on the type reported by him-self. The principal trades-off the  - 
sociaüy optimal performance [c$~(.)]  when  an agent has only the first class of  incentives (he 
overstates his type), with the socially optimal one [&(m)] when he has only the second class (he 
understate his type). As the Spence-Mirrlees condition still holds (an inefficient agent has to be 
more compensated than an efficient one, for an unitary increase in performance), that trade-off 
always finishes with a decreasing performance function, which is, therefore, dominant strategy 
implementable (it may have a flat piece where none of the two class of incentives prevails). 
For example, in  the frame of  regulation of  industrial poiiution, where  x, would be a 
verifiable  indicator  of  the  fírm  i's  environment  cleanness  (%=O  indicates  the  maximal 
contamination and xi= +  o0  denotes the minimal one), the hypothesis ITSVI is  justifiable. In this 
context, under TSD, and if each fixed cost of the technology to reduce pollution is decreasing 
in the marginal cost, the above results imply that there is not loss of generality if the policy of 
pollution regulation considers only the dominant strategy implementation. Moreover, the socially 
optimal pollution of each firm will depend only of his individual report and it will be constant 
in a subinterval of types. Note that, under the conditions of Proposition 5, the optimal performance of programs 
BP or DP is obtained solving each EBP,, whose solution can be calculated maximizing on  ri  E 
0,  the function: 
It can be proved that, at the optimal value ri,  the correspondent individual performance 
function is continuous. 4.- THE PROPERTlES OF OPTIMAL PERFORMANCES IN  THE FIRST SETTING 
In this section we will apply Proposition 3 in order to analyze the properties of optimal 
performances. We will examine three cases.  In  the first two cases, we will assume that the 
principal's  virtual  income depends  on performances  only by  means  of  the  aggregate  total 
performance. We will suppose: 
Virtual income devending on total verformance (VIDTP) 
W(x,B) = W(C xJ where W(-)  is CZ  and satisfies W'(.)  = O, W"(-)  < O.4 
This assumption is verified, for example, in the frame of the regulation of a private good, 
because, in that case, it is easy to show that the virtual income is equal to S(C x,),  where S(.) 
denotes the consumers' gross surplus. 
The third case that we wiíi examine corresponds to the regulation of a monopolist with 
several independent divisions (or the one of a group of firms), each one producing a different 
private good. In this case, we have W(x,B) = S(x), where S(x) represents the consumers' gross 
surplus of the vector of productions x. Therefore, condition ITVI holds. 
4.1 .-  HOMOGENEOUS PERFORMANCES AND LINEAR DEPENDENCE 
In this subsection we assume VIDTP and 
Linear devendence (LD) 
v,(x,O)  = O x + *¡(O),  x  2 O,  *,(e)  2  O, qi'(.)  2 O,  O  E e,,  vi. 
We can think of regulation of a private good produced by an oligopoly in which every 
firm has a hidden constant marginal cost and a fixed cost increasing in his marginal cost. 
Under VIDTP, LD and complete information, it is optimal for the principal that only the 
agents with the lowest marginal cost have a positive performance.  The foíiowing proposition 
prove that this conclusion can be extended to  the case of incomplete information. If previous 
conditions hold, the principal may prefer to require a performance which is only positive for the 
most virtually efficient agents (generically only one). 
4Note that W(-,  e)  may  depend  on  A.  We have  suppresed the variable simplifying the 
notation. Proposition  6  Given  assumptions SU-,  MHR-,  LD,  VLDTP,  suppose that  morwver  the 
condition W'(+oo)  5  a(-) 2  W'(O+)  holds, with 
Fi(OS  vi  a(R):=min[Q>,(B,)lk=l,  ...,  nl,  Q>i(OJ:=Oi+h-,  .m 
Then, the optimal performance function x*(.) exists, is unique and satisfies: 
(a)  x;(O)  = O if $¡(O3  > a(O), 
@)  if x*¡(O)  > O then +¡(e3  = a(O), 
(c)  C x;(-)  = D(a(.)) where D :  = (W)-' 
(d)  The principal's optimal expected utility is: 
- 
W(D@)  + j  ~(a)G@)do  -  E El,  -A C ui 
a 
where  Ci(-) =(l-A)\ki(.)+h\ki(Bi)  Vi,  G(.)  is the distribution function  of  o(.) induced by 
distributions (Fi(.) 1 i=l,..  .,n} and [a,;]  -  is  its support. 
Proof: According to definition of a(.), we have W(C xJ - C $¡(Oi)xi  S W(C xi) - a(O) C xi, and 
the function z -z W(z)-a(8)z has an absolute maximum at z=D(a(O))  by VIDTP.  Therefore, 
there is x"(6) E Rn+  maximizing Q(x,O) on Rn+  for each value of  O (and A).  Morwver we have: 
a,ra(x,o) = wl(  CXJ -  ~>~(e.).  m 
Consider I(6): =  {i  1 x*¡(@) > O].  From (7), there is t(8) such that vi €  I(B) &(0J =t(O). 
In addition, the function [(e)  must verify the equality W'(CX*~(.))  =E(  ) because iE  I(O) implies 
a+n(~*(e),e)  =o. 
If there was k such that +,(Oa  < [(e),  we should have k@I(B). But then, the relations 
xSk(O)  =O  and  a%,tI(x  * (O),@)  = t(R) -  Q>,(OJ  >O  would  hold  contradicting that x"(.)  is optimal. 
Therefore, we have e(@)=a(B)  and the properties (a), @),  (c) hold. 
Denoting the distribution function of a(-)  as G(-), the principal's expected utility is: 
and if we integrate it by parts, we obtain (d). O Proposition 6 has a straightforward interpretation. Under the above assumptions, from 
Proposition 3, there is not loss of  generality if  the principal only  considers mechanisms for 
which each agent reports his true type as a dominant strategy. Therefore, the principal has to 
take into account essentialiy the agents'  efficiencies corrected with  the social cost of  hidden 
information, i.e.  the agents' virtual marginal costs  &+(e)  Vi  defined in Proposition 6. So, a(.) 
represents the smallest virtual marginal cost and the principal will elicit a positive performance 
only from the agents with such a virtual marginal cost a(-). 
In  the context  of  regulation  of  a private good,  the conclusion  (c)  of  Proposition  6 
indicates that,  the sociaily optimal price is equal to the smallest virtual marginal  cost.  The 
condition W'(+ m)  S  a(.)  5 W'(O+)  makes sure that the equality between  the principal's 
virtual marginal income and the least virtual marginal cost is feasible. 
Remark 1. Note that, under the conditions of Proposition 6, the optimal performance ~"~(8)  of 
an agent i with a virtual marginal cost equal to a(B) may he defined of several ways if there are 
severa1 agents with such a minimal virtual marginal cost. In this case, for any selection of values 
x*,(B);  k E N(9): = argmir~[+~(O~)  / j =  1,.  .  .  ,n] satisfying the equality (c) of Proposition 6, the 
agent i's optimal performance x*,(&~,@,)  is decreasing in 8, because we have: 
with  a.i(O.J:=min[+j(Oj)  lj=l,  ...,  n,j+i],  and  D'(-) = 1 /W"@(-))  < O. 
In the linear case examined in  Proposition 6 the optimal performance function x*(.), 
although it is discontinuous, satisfies some of the properties correspondent to the basic one-agent 
adverse selection model [which appears,  for instante, in Baron  (1989)l. The aggregate total 
performance is decreasing (in any type) and each agent is asked for an optimal performance 
decreasing in his type. 
In order to compare the optimal performance of incomplete information with the one of 
complete information, note that the complete information solution, which will be called xC'( .), 
verifies the properties (a),  @),  (c) of Proposition 6 for the functions +¡(S)  and a(-)  obtained 
with h=O (recall that, then, programs VP and CIP coincide). Thus, we have: 
where ac'.i(O.i):  =min[Oj  1 j =  1,.  .  .  ,n, j +i], and also C xCJi(B) = D(ac'(0))  with aC'(B): =min[Bj  / 
j=l, ...,  n]. Like in the one-agent basic adverse selection model, the aggregate total performance of 
complete information ís grater than  the one of  incomplete information. Nevertlieless,  at the 
individual level, this inequality may be reversed. We can show easily that the only case in which 
it is reversed corresponds to a vector 8 such that, for some agent i, we have 
because, in this case, xcli(fl) = O < D(4i(ei)) = ~"~(8). 
Note  that the above inequalities cannot  hold  if  the distributions of types are  equal. 
Therefore,  we can  conclude that,  under  the assumptions of  Proposition 6 and  if  types  are 
identically distributed, each agent is required to perform under the level of complete information 
(in order to reduce the informational rent of the most efficient agent's type, iike in the basic 
one-agent adverse selection model). 
Nevertheless, when the distributions of types are different, it may happen that an agent, 
which does not perform under complete information, is asked for a positive performance under 
incomplete information. The explanation is simple. The supposed assumptions imply that only 
the agents with the smallest marginal cost or the smallest virtual marginal cost can be required 
to  perform  under,  respectively, complete information and  incomplete information.  But  the 
"orders" over agents induced by marginal costs and virtual marginal costs may be different if 
the distributions of types are distinct. 
To analyze the relationship between the principal's ex ante optimal expected utiiity and 
the agents'  number,  under  VIDTP and LD, we consider the symmetrical case in which  the 
distxibutions of types, the agents' fixed costs and reservation utilities coincide: 
Svmmetrical agents (SA) 
fi(.) -  f(.),  Fi(-)  F(.),  ()  = ()  ui = U, vi. 
In this symmetrical case, an augmentation of the agents' number yields an improvement 
(decrease) of a according to the first order stochastic dominance. Under the assumptions of 
Proposition 6, the principal may prefer ex ante to hire severai agents. 
Coroiiary 1  Under the assumptions SU-, LD, MHR-, VIDTP, SA and supposing W'(+ w) 5 
U(@) I  W'(O+)  V8,  we have that: (a)  The principal's expected utility hiring n agents is: 
- 
(b) If  E~+AU  rii:  =  D(Q)  [i  -F(+-~(~))JIO~[[~  -F(+(~))I-']~~  >O  the  principal prefers to  i  - 
hire  only one agent. But if E<+Au < Ü,  he  prefers ex ante to hire more than one agent, i. e. 
U'(1)  > o. 
Proof: From AS, MHR-, the values of a(@:  = min[  &(O&  1  k=l,  ...,  n 1, as a random variable, 
are placed between g:  =@+AF@/f@  -  and &:=B+kFfi)/ffi) with a distribution function equal 
to 
G,(a):  =1-[l-E($-'(a))r,  where $(y): = y+hF(y)/f(y);  4 I y 5 0. 
From Proposition 6, the optimal expected utility of a principal hiring n agents is the one 
in (a). Then, we have that  a,,U(n)  = V(n) - (EI+hu), where 
- 
and we can verify that a,W  < O, V(l) = u, V(+ w)  = O.  Therefore, (b) holds. U 
Let us interpret the above result in the frame of regulation of a private good produced 
by an oligopoly. If production technologies have a constant marginal cost and a fixed cost, which 
are increasing functions of  a hidden parameter, and if  such a parameter is independent and 
identically distnbuted between the regulated firms, despite the adverse selection problem, an ex 
ante limit in the regulated firms' number, of an optimal regulatory policy, will be decreasing in 
the firm's expected fixed cost. 
Remark  2.  Changing  SU-,  MHR-  by  SU+,  MHR+,  we  should  obtain  similar results  to 
Proposition 6 and Corollary 1. In that case, we should have a(9): =max[  &(@A  1 k=  1,.  .  .  ,n J 
where we should demand a positive performance to the agents with  $¡(Oi)  = a(@),  and  C x",(.)  = 
D(-a(.)) would  hold.  The condition for the existente of  the optiinal performance would be 
W'(+w) 5  -a(.)  5  w'(O+). 
Specifying the model, we can study the behavior of the optimal size of agency (optimal 
agents' number). As an illustration, consider a firm purchasing input to several suppliers, with 
a linear demand function, constant returns to scale and a uniform distribution of types. Then we 
have the foliowing properties @roved in Appendix 2). 
Examp1e.-  Under the assumptions of Corollary 1, suppose the symmetrical case corresponding 
to: 
f(~)=lIp;  O<T<@,  O  B(x,@)=[P(C  xi )-C] C xi, 
X=l,  c > O,  P(x) = a-x,  a > c  >2B, 
Then, we have that: 
(a)  The firm's expected profit hiring n suppliers is: 
(b)  The profit critica1 value is Ü=B[9(a-c)-10~]/36. 
(c)  The optimal number of suppliers n*  is increasing in the profitability a and decreasing 
in the constant production cost c  and  in  the suppliers' reservation  utility  u.  If  n*  2  2, n' 
increases with the unceriainty p, but nevertheless, the firm's optimal expected profit decreases 
with p. 
4.2.- HOMOGENEOUS PERFORMANCE AND  CONVEX DEPENDENCE 
In the linear case in Subsection 4.1 (Proposition 6), when agents are symmetrical, the 
optimal performance  function  x*(.),  although  it  is  discontinuous,  satisfies  the  properties 
corresponditig to the basic one-agent adverse selection model. This conclusion changes when the 
disutility of each agent is strictly convex in  his performance. Although the aggregate total 
performance is lesser than the one of  complete information, the inequality may be individually 
reversed for the most efficient agents when the set of contractual types is heterogeneous enough. Proposition 7.- Suppose SU-, MHR-, AS, CS-, VIDTP, MAW,  h>O and 
Let x8(.) and xC'(.) be respectively the optimal performance functions of incomplete and 
complete information and assume that they are strictly po~itive.~ 
Then the following assertions hold: 
(a)  For each i.,  x"(.),  xC1(.)  are C1, strictly decreasing in Oi  and  strictly increasing in 
8,  for kfi. 
(b)  Bi  < Oj implies x*,(fl) > x;(fl),  xcl,(%)  > xc\(%). 
(c)  C xSi(.) and E x"(.)  are strictly decreasing in each O,,  Vk. 
(d) E xCri(.) 2  E x*¡(.),  with strict inequaliiy at fl 
such that 8,  > -  O for some k, and E xC:@  = E x*,@ where &=@, ...,a. 
(e)  xC1,(0) < xSi(fl), if 8 verifies Bi  = 8, 8,  > 8 for some k # i. 
Proof: From Proposition 3, [t( -),x(.)] is an  optimal mechanism of program BP if and only if 
the function x(.)is a  solution of  program  VP  and  then,  by  VIDTP,  x*(.)  has  to pointwise 
maximize the function  O(x,B): = W(C xi) - C y(xi,OJ, where 
Because xU(-)  is interior, we have: 
W'(E  xSk(o)) = a,y(~*~(fl),~i)  vo, vi.  (8) 
Let t.(-)  be such that t*(fl) = W'(E xek(0))  VO  and denote D -  (W')-l. 
The function a,y(.  ,O)  is C1 for each  O  and  moreover  ¿),y(-,  e) >O  from the assumptions on 
v(-,  S).  Applying the inverse function theorem, there is p(.,  e) of  class C1 such that p(. ,O)  = 
[axy(-  ,O)]-'  and it satisfies ag(z,O) >O,  aop(z,O)  <  O. Because, by (8), we have: 
xVi(%)  = p(t*(8),0J,  v%, vi,  (9) 
the value ["(O)  is necessarily a solution of  O = H(z,fl) for each fl,  where 
They exist and are continuous if, for instance, v(x,B)=Bq(x),  qE  C2, q" >O,  q3(0)=0,  p3(+  m)= +  m, 
s>o,  w'(O)>O.  - is a C1 function and verifies da(.  ,  S) >  O.  From the implicit function theorem, E*(.) is of class 
C'. 
The optimal performance function x  (S)  of complete information has to be a solution of 
program CIP and using a similar argument, it must verify: 
c1  CI  xCIi(B) = p  (E  (O),OJ,  vO,  vi,  (11) 
letting pa(.,O)  be the inverse function of a,v(- ,O)  for each O,  and letting EC'(0) be a solution of 
o=H'!'(z,R),  where 
p(z,fl): = C pa(z,Oi) - D(z).  (12) 
The  fnnction pC1(-,  S)  is  also  of  class  C'  and  satisfies asC'(z,O)>O,  a8pC'(z,0)<0. 
Therefore E"(.)  is continuously differentiable. 
The performances x;(-)  and  xCli(-)  are decreasing in  Oi  accordingly to Proposition 2 
[xs(.)  and xC'(.)  are dominant strategy implementable]. We will show later that the relations 
aO,ts(e)  >o, ao,tcl(e) >o 
hold and then, will have, from (9) and (1 l),  the inequalities  a,n, * (8)  >  O,  a,,xF(O)  >  O  for k ti i 
because a, p  < O holds. Therefore we will obtain part (a). 
As the relations a8p(. ,  m)  < O and aopcl(. ,  S)  < O hold, for O such that Oi  < Oj we have 
x'i(0)=p(~*(O),OJ > p([*(R),OJ  = xej(0)  and, similarly, we get xai(0)  > xaj(B).  Then, we have 
Part (b). 
From  the properties  of  p,  pC',  D, and  differentiating the expressions H(E*(O),B)=O, 
@'(EC1(0),R)=O,  we obtain  ao>j'(B)  >O,  ao+xF(0) >O.  This implies that part (c) holds because 
D' <O. 
By  the definition of  y(-,  S)  and  assumption CS-,  the inequality &y(. ,O)  2 a,v(.  ,O) 
holds,  and  moreover  strictly if  O  > -  O.  Therefore, we have p(. ,O)  5 pcl(.  ,O)  with  strict 
inequality if O  > -  O.  Then, form (10) and  (12) we get P1(z,O) 2 H(z,R)  Vz  VR  and besides 
strictly if O,  >  for some k. This implies <"(O)  S  E*@) [strictly if there is k such that 0,  1 
OJ,  because H(. ,O)  and p(-  ,O)  are. strictly increasing, and (d) holds. It is clear that C xCIi(e) 
= E xai@, because y(-,-)  = v(.,-). Finaüy, let O be such that Oi = e, O,  > e for some k  # i. Then we have 
because ,$C'(0) < ,$"(O),  and the part (e) holds.  O 
Under  the conditions of  Proposition 7, if  the  set  of  contractual types is completely 
homogeneous, i. e.,  B is such that Oi  = 0 E ]e, B]  Vi,  we wíll have xCIi(0) = D(tC'(0))ln  > 
D(,$*(O))ln = x*,(@)  vi. By  continuity, if the set of types was not heterogeneous enough, we 
should have xCIi(0) r xei(0)  Vi. However, Proposition 7(e) indicates that the optimal mechanism 
may ask very efficient agents for an individual performance greater than the one of complete 
information, if the set of contractual types is heterogeneous enough. 
The intuition, under  SU-, is the following. Similarly to the basic one-agent adverse 
selection model, each agent in our model prefers to overstate his type when the principal offers 
the optimal mechanism of  complete information. In order to see this, note that the agent i's 
utility of type Oi,  announcing T¡  > 4, is: 
which is grater than u when ri > 4, because condition MAW holds. 
Therefore, in order to decrease the agent i's informational rent: 
the principal has to reduce the required performance, because we suppose the Spence-M'ilees' 
condition d,,v  > 0. 
But, on the other hand, we have  a,x,"(B)  >O  (if the agent k's  type increases, the agent 
i's efficiency nses relating to the one of the agent k and the mechanism asks the agent i for more 
performance). This implies that the agent i's informational rent R,(Bk,~,,xC'(.)) decreases when 
the  agent k  is prevented  from announcing the type  T,  >  O,.  Then,  the principal  "saves" 
informational rent of an agent inducing the tmthful revelation of types of others agents. 
As this diminution in rent increases with the agent i's efficiency, Le., the principal may prefer to increase the required performance, in relation to the one of complete 
information, for very efficient agents if the set of  contractual types is heterogeneous enough. 
Remark 3. Changing SU-, MHR- by SU+, MHRf in Proposition 7, we obtain an analogous 
result. For this we should suppose v(.,  a)  satisfying 
The functions xai(-)  and xC',(-) woiild be s. increasing in  Oi  and s. decreasing in 8,  with k#i. 
Now  8,<Oj would imply xej(0) --:  x*~(B),  xC1,(0) < xC\(0) and the aggregate total performance 
would be s. increasing in each type. We should have also C xClj(.) 2 C xWi(-),  but now strictly 
at 0 such that 19,  <  for some k, and E xC1,(8) = C xei(0) if 0=(B,. .  .  ,B).  Moreover,  given i, 
xCIi(0) < xaj(0)  would hold if 0 satisfies O,=;,  O,<;  for some kf  i. 
In this Convex Case the principal may also prefer ex ante to hire several agents. 
Coroilary 2  Under the assumptions of Proposition 7, suppose the case: 
Then, the optimal performance functions x'(-) and xC'(.), of  incomplete and complete 
information respectively, exist and are interior. 
If the the vaiue (1-h)~?Ir+h*(B)+hu is low enough, the principal prefers ex ante to hire 
more than one agent. 
Proof: From  Proposition  3 and  assuming the  considered case,  if  the optimai performance 
function of incomplete information x*(.)  exists, it will pointwise maximize the function: 
F(B)  fl  .):=(l-A)*(  .)+AS@).  As 4(.)  > O and  we assume W'(0)  > 0,  where  $(O)  = 8  +  X - 
f(0) ' 
This holds if, for instance, v(x,U) = O<p(x),  <p  E  CZ,  <p"  < 0, c > 0, with  +(O):  =8-A(1-F(O))If(O) 5 
0, VU.  Note that y(x,O)=+(O)<p(x)  in this case. For an uniform distribution of typec, we have +(S)  >O if !/U 
> A/(l+X). W"(-) < O, every maximum of  Q(.,O), on P+  ,  has to be interior. Therefore, if x8(.) exists, 
it will be interior. 
Using a similar argument for Qc'(x,O) = W(C  xi ) - C Oi  x:/2  - n(Eq+Au), we have that 
if the optimal performance function of complete information xC'(.) exists, it will be interior. 
By  Proposition  7,  if  x'(.)  and  xC'(.)  exist,  the  values  E'(O)=W'(CX*~(O))  and 
ECr(O) =  W'(Exak(0))  will be solutions respectively of H(z,B)  =O  and HC1(z,B)  =O, for each O, with 
H(z,O)  =zs(O)-D(z),  P1(z,O)  =zscr(B)-~(z)  where 
Since S(-) > O, we have that H(W'(O),O) = W'(O)s(O) > O.  On  the other  hand, if 
W'(+w)SO the  inequality  H(O,O)  =  -D(O)  <  O  holds;  and  if  W'(+w) >  O  we  get 
H(W1(+  -),O)  = -m.  This implies that for any O there is a unique z  > O such that 
H(z,O) = o. 
Given E*(.)  > O such that H(E*(O),Q)=O  for each O, the function x*(.) defined by xai(0) 
=  E"(0)/4(03 Vi is  the  only  pointwise  maximum  of  Q(.  ,  -)  and  it  is,  then,  the  optimal 
performance function of incomplete information. 
A similar argument shows that xC1(-)  exists, is unique and interior. 
Note that from the implicit function theorem, we have E"(O)=E(s(O))  VO, where E(-) > 
O is a function of class C'  on  S> O satisfying: 
Moreover, we obtaín E'@)  = E(s)/P'(t(s))-S]  < O deriving (15). 
Substituting x*(-)  into (13) and by  (14)  and (15),  the principal's expected utility can be 
rewritten as 
E[Q(x"(O),O)I  = E[J(s(O))l  - n@r+Au) 
where  J(s):=  W[D(E(s))l  - 8s)  D(t(s))/2. 
If we derive J(.), we can use (15) to obtain: J'(s) = [<(s)I2/2  > 0. Let  P(s;n)  be  the  distribution  function  of  S(.)  induced  by  the  random  vector  O 
corresponding to n agents. Consider n'  > n. We have: 
since +(a)  > O.  On the other hand, we have that l/d>(.) E [l/+(e),l/OJ  and, therefore, for each 
s E ]n/+$),  n'l4@)[  U  ]n/f,  n3/e[  the inequality F(s;n9) < F(s;n) holds. 
The latter points out that an increase of agents' number n produces an improvement of 
F(. ;  e) according to the first order stochastic dominance. 
As J'(-) > 0, the function E[J(s(O))] has to be strictly increasing in the agents' number. 
FinaUy, from (16), we get that if E(+Au  is lower enough, the principal prefers ex ante to hire 
more than one agent. O 
The intuition is similar to the one of linear case. Now, the principal's  expected utility 
depends increasingly on S(@),  a value which measures the total marginal utility that, for the 
principal,  represents  contracting n  agents  of  tges O,  because  +(O)  is the virtual  marginal 
disutility of an agent with type R. The distribution of S(.) increases with the agents' number n, 
according to the first order stochastic dominance, and therefore, the principal's expected utility 
increases with n if the reservation utility is low. 
Let us interpret the above results in the frame of the firm which purchases an  input to 
several exclusive suppliers, each one of them possessing a strictly increasing marginal production 
cost which depends on his hidden type according to Proposition 7. In this case, as A= 1 and 
&=O  Vi we have W=B=[P(CxJ-c]Cx,,  if we assume that the firm transforms an unity of input 
to an unity of output with a constant marginal cost equal to c.  On the one hand, if types are 
independents, the firm may ex ante prefer to contract with several suppliers because the ex ante 
distribution of the "total" virtual marginal costs of engaged suppliers improves with the number 
of them. On the other hand, when the firm has several suppliers, unlike the case with only one, 
the firm may require a very efficient supplier to produce a quantity of input greater than the one 
of complete information. The reason is that a decrease in a supplier's input quantity, to reduce 
his informational rent, makes an increase of the others supplier's quantities more desirable for 
the firm and, therefore, the firm has to make a trade-off between the several possible reductions 
of suppiier's quantities with regard to the ones of  complete information. 4.3.- HETEROGENEOUS PERFORMANCE: THE CASE OF REGULATION 
In this subsection we will apply the results of Section 2 in order to analyze the properties 
of the optimal regulatory mechanism in the bellow setting of regulation of several private goods. 
Consider the regulation of a monopoly with several independent divisions (or the one of a group 
of firms), each one producing a different good. Let xi be the quantity of good i produced by the 
division (or firm) i=  1,.  .  .  ,n. 
The production cost of  the division i is Ci(x,,8J  and  we assume  the hypotheses of 
Proposition 3 implying the equivalente between the Bayesian implementation and the dominant 
strategy  implementation.  Therefore,  we  will  suppose  that  Fi(-)/fi(.)  is  increasing, 
axpiCi  >  O,  axrO,,l  is increasing in 8,  and  a,,Ci 20,  for any i. 
Let S(x) denote the consumers' gross surplus. It depends on the vector x=(x,, .  .  .  ,x,J  of 
productions of  goods. Therefore the (linear) price is  Pi(x)  =a=S(x). The regulator's  objective 
function is  S(X) - c P,(x)x, - c si + (1-A) c [ si + pi(x)xi - c,(x,,~J  ] 
and we can verify that, according to our formulation, we have: 
with a virtual income equal to W(x,B) = S(x). 
In order to obtain intuitions about optimal productions, we assume the following quadratic 
frame: 
where d  E 1-l/(n-1), 11, a>O, and 
Ci(xi,8J =Oixi+qi(8,), 8,E e,, xir  0, -  8 >O,  *,(S) r O,  q;(.)  2 Ovi. 
Thus, the price of good i is 
P,(x)=a-x,-d  x.. 
j=1,j+i ' 
Note that, for d<O goods are complements and for d>O goods are substitutes. Now, conclusions change according to the class of goods. When goods are complements, 
any optimal production is lower than  the one of  complete information. But  when goods are 
substitutes, this inequality may be reversed for the most efficient divisions (or firms) if there are 
another ones which are not so efficient. 
Proposition 8  If a>O is high enough, in the above quadratic case of regulation, the optimal 
prices  and  productions  of  incomplete  information x"(.),  P.(.)  and  the  ones  of  complete 
information xCr(.), PC'( -)  verify the following properties: 
(a)  a,x,*  <O,  <O,  vi. 
@)  If goods are substitutes (d >  O):  a,:;  >O,  >O,  vj  #i. 
If  goods are complements (d <O):  al*  <O,  aB,xF <O,  vj  # i. 
(c) When goods are substitutes (d >  O),  given 0 such that Bi  = 4 ,  Bj  > 5 for some j #i, 
we have that xc1,(0) < x*¡(O). 
When goods are complements (d<O), we have xCri(0) 2  xmi(U)  Vd, with  strict 
inequality if 0 Z  @,,&,...,&. 
(d)  Pc'i(U)  = Bi,  PVi(U)  = Oi  + X Fi(OJ/fi(Oi ),  Vi. 
Proof: Hypotheses imply that, applying Proposition 3, the vector of optimal productions x8(-) 
of incomplete information is obtained by pointwise maximizing the function 
Q(x,O) = S(x) - C 4(Oi)xi - E  Ec,  where &(e):  = (l-h)Ti(-)+hqi@i) vi 
and the virtual marginal production cost of  division (or fnm) i is bi(QJ:  = Oi  + A Fi(Oi )lfi(OJ. 
As  a=,+>  = -1,  axFjQ  = -d, j # i, the matrix M of second-derivatives of hk  with respect the 
variables (x,,  .  .  .  ,x,J  satisfies x M x = (d-1) [  C xz - [d/(d-l)]x2 ] = (d-1) C (xi - cu~)~  < O,  vx 
1  nd  where x: =Exi  and  a = -  [[  1 +[1+  -]i12  > 1 because ndl(1-d)  > -1 
n  (1 -4 
when -Il(n-1)  < d i  l. 
Therefore, the matrk M is negative definite and any x verifying P,(x)=$~(O~)  Vi is a absolute 
maximum of the function 0(.,0). Adding the expressions  a  -x, -d  xj = +;(OS  vi, we obtain 
j=1,j*i 
ni*(@)  =  1  d  " 
l+(n-l)d 
1+(n-2)d]$j(O~  1,  vi.  U a+Iml,  7  ?j(Oj)-[  -d 
J=Jf  2 
As the complete information solution verifies the above expressions if 4i(Oi) is changed 
by Oi  for al1 i, the assertions (a) and (b) hold. 
The assertion (c) is satisfied also, because, for al1 i and al1 0, 
d  "  $(Oj)  1 + (n  -2)d  l(e.1 
xi * (O)  -X?(O)  =  "[-]E  -  -  1-n 
i +(n-  l)d  1-d  j=l,j+; J(Oj)  1-d  J(O$ 
Finally, it is clear that the assertion (d) holds.  O 
The intuition of this proposition complements the one of Proposition 7. Like above, to 
reduce the informational rent of a division (or firm) the regulator (principal), in principle, has 
to ask it for a production lower than the one of complete information. 
When goods are complements, if the quantity of a good goes down, the marginal social 
value of another goods decreases also. Therefore, the regulator distorts productions away from 
first-best allocations because informational rents and  marginal social values go "in the same 
direction". 
When goods are substitutes, informational rents and marginal social values go in opposite 
directions: if the production of a good decreases, the marginal social value of the other goods 
increases. The optimal distortion, with regard to the complete information solution, has to make 
a trade-off among the reductions in rent of divisions. Like in the former subsection, the regulator 
may prefer to increase the elicited production, with regard to the one of complete information, 
from a ver-  efficient division. 5.- SECOND SETTING. INDIVIDUAL PERFORMANCES BASED ON 
INDTVIDUAL TYPES 
This section analyzes our second setting, where feasible mechanisms have each individual 
performance based only on the type reported by the respective agent. This class of mechanisms 
is justifiable under two conditions: contracts depending on performances are the only feasible, 
and every agent takes a hidden  action, after privately observing his type, which  determines 
univocally his performance. 
There  are  plenty  of  economic  situations  in  which  the  first  condition  holds:  the 
remuneration of  some agents (workers, employees, sellers) is basad directly on performances 
or another indicators  [see the  chapters  12 and  13 of  Migrom & Roberts  (1992)l  (not  on 
mechanisms). To give a more precise sense to the second condition, which is also assumed in 
the model with  correlated types of  Demski & Sappington (1984), suppose that the agent i's 
(verifiable) performance is xi=Xi(ai,OJ, where ai denotes the hidden actioii (for instance, an 
effort) which the agent takes after observing his type  and accepting his contract. Assume that 
the agent i's utility function is Ui(ti,x,aJ = ti + Ri(x) - 5Pi(aJ, where 5Pi(.)  denotes the disutility 
of his action. Given ai=pi(xi,OJ where vi(. ,9J is the inverse functioii of Xi(-  ,Oi), we can rewrite 
the agent's utility function as ti + R,(x) - 5Pi(pi(xi,0J)  and we obtain a similar expression to the 
ones in  Section 2. 
Let us remark that if the feasible contracts depends only on performances x =  (x,, .  . .,aC3, 
every strategy xi(-) of agent i depends only on his type Oi. 
In  spite of  this  constraint,  supposing the  above two  conditions,  we  prove  that  the 
principal can utilize, in an equivalent manner, mechanisms [t(  -),x( .)] such that each individual 
performance function xi( -)  depends only on the agent i's announced type di. We will denote x.~(( 
¡)  the performance vector: 
Proposition 9 
(a)  Let Si(.), xi(.), i=l,  ...,  n, be satisfying Then, the functions ti(-), i=l,.  ..  ,n, which  are defined ti@+) = E'[  S,(X.~(O.J,X~(O,))  1, 
i=l,  ...,  n, verify 
@)  Given ti(.),  xi(.), i =  1,. .  .  ,n, satisfying the expressions (18) there are contracts Si(-), 
i= 1,.  .  .n, verifying (17) and such that: 
E'[ si(~.i(O.J,~i(e,))  ] = {(si),  O,  vi. 
Proof: (a) Let Si(.), xi(.), i=  1,. .  .  ,n, be verifying (17). Given functions ti(-) defined above, as 
each x,(.)  depends only on O,  for each k and the mathematical expectation is a linear operator, 
it is easy to show that if we apply (17) for xi=xi(OJ, we obtain (18). 
(b)  Let ti(-), xi(.),  i=l,  ...,  n, satisfying (18). From  (18) we have  that xi(%J=xi(Oi') 
implies ti(@= ti(@'').  Therefore, the following contracts are well defied and they satisfy (17): 
where 
5.1.- TEIE EQUWALENCE OF IMPLEMENTATIONS IN THE SECOND SETTING 
We have just  shown that contract implementation is equivalent to the one realized by 
mechanisms verifying (18). On the other hand, it is obvious that there is not loss of generality 
if, in the Bayesian program BP',  we change self-selection constraints for the ones defined in 
(18). The equivalente between programs BP'  and DP' holds now, under the assumption 
Spence-Mirrlees'  condition (SM) 
aXci(-,.)  >o vi 
Proposition 10  Under SU, SM, we have r(BP') = r(DP'). 
Proof: Given a feasible mechanism  [t(.),x(.)] for the program DP',  g(.),x(-)] is a feasible 
mechanism for BP', with &(S):  = E'[C(@.~,  .)], i=  1,.  ..,n, because the functions z(-) satisfy (18). Moreover,  it  is  evident  that  the  equaiities  E[~+(.)]=E&(.)]  vi  hold.  Then,  we  have 
r(DP')  r(BP'). 
Given a feasible mechanism [t(.),x(-)] for the program BP',  using a similar argument 
like the one in the proof of Proposition 2 (for the function Q), applied to the constraints (1) [or 
(M)], we obtain for each r,, 0,  and i: 
Because the function x,(.)  depends only on  O,  for ail k,  by SU- we have: 
Therefore, condition SM implies that xi(.) is decreasing Vi. 
On the other hand, using a similar argument to the one in Proposition 1, 
we have VOi,  vi: 
But as xi(.)  is decreasing and we assume SM, the transfer functions 
dominant strategy implement x(-) and they  satisfy E&(-)] = E[ti(-)] for every i. We have, 
then, r(BP')  r(DP'). 
Under  SU+,  a  similar argument  shows that  each  xi(.)  is increasing and  dominant 
strategy implementable. 
5.2.-  PROPERTIES OF THE OPTIMAL PERFORMANCES IN  THE SECOND SETTING 
Consider, as in  Section 2, the virtual program which wiii be cailed VP'. Such a program 
is similar to VP except that feasible functions x(.) satisfy that every x,(.)  depends only on O,. 
Then, the program VP' is not equivalent generally to the pointwise maximization of the function 
Q(x,B). Nevertheless, under the assumptions of Proposition 3, the equivalence among the three 
programs BP', DP' and VP' holds. Proposition 11  Under the assumptions SU, MHR, CS, MAW, ITVI, we have 
(a)  i'(BP')  = F(DP')  = I'(VP'). 
(b)  Supposing that the function O(. ,  e) is C' and wncave in x, the performance function 
x(-)  is optimal if and only if the following  conditions hold: 
Ei[a,0(x,(8J,x,(-),O,,  -)] <O,  a.e. vi 
Proof: (a) A similar argument to the one in Proposition 1, shows that F(BP')  = 
rpp7)  I rwp1). 
Under SU-, given a solution x(.) of VP', we have for al1 i and for al1 Bi 
where the functions yk(. ,  S)  are defined in Proposition 2. Utilizing an argument similar to its 
proof, we have that xi(-)  is decreasing and, therefore, dominant strategy implementable. Since 
we assume MAW, we get I'(VP')<I'(DP'). 
If we suppose SU+ the line of argument is analogous. 
(b) By the part (a), x(.)  is an optimal performance function if and oniy if it is a solution 
of  program VP'.  Supposing the assumptions in  the part (b),  the functionai T(-), defined by 
T(x(-)): =E[Q(x(B),B)],  is Fréchet differentiable and concave on the convex cone P  of positive 
functions in the normed space of piecewise continuously differentiable functions x(.),  satisfying 
that each x,(.)  depends only on  O,. 
Therefore [see section 8.7 of Luenberger (1969)], x(-) maximizes T(.) on P  if and only 
if: 
GT(x(-);h(.))  I O,  V h  E 'J',  P,T(x(.);x(-))  = O, 
where 6T(x(.); .)  represents the Fréchet differential of the functional T(.) at the vector x(.). 
Because 
67yx(  .);M  e))  =E[  C axiQ(x(@,4h,(0,)  1 
and  moreover the density functions of  types are strictly positive and IP  is formed by positive 
functions, we can deduce easily the conditions of part (b). O Under complete information, we assume also, in  this second setting, that the feasible 
"equivalent" mechanisms have each  individual performance function depending only on  the 
respective type. Therefore, under complete information, the principal will solve the program: 
(CIP')  max  E[ B(x,B) + A E Vi(x,OJ  - A  C ui 1. 
x('> 
Assuming that the principal's virtual income depends on performances only through the 
aggregate total performance, the optimal performance demanded to the most efficient agents may 
be greater than the one of  complete information. 
Corollary 3  Given the assumptions SU-, MHR-, LD, VIDTP, AS, suppose the case: 
W(z) = a(l-eb7,  with  a>O,  b>O,  ab > @'  (B)/(E~)"', 8>0 
where  6(8):=  8 + A F(0) 1 f(8),  X  > O.  Then, 
(a) The optimal performance functions of  incomplete and complete  information satisfy 
respectively: 
where O  < pi < E6  1 6(B),  O  < pCIi < E0 /e,  i=l,  ...,  n, 
verify II pi = E6 / (ab), 11  pCri  = E0 1 (ab). 
@)  There is i such that xl(e) < x*~@  if n  2 2. 
Proof: From Proposition 11, xS(.) is an interior optimal performance function if and only if: 
" 
abexp[-bxi*(OJ]E[ exp[-b  x,*(Ok)]  =$(0J, vOi,  vi. 
k=I,k*i 
As types are independent, denoting p,=E{exp[-b  x",(Oi)]f  vi, the above equalities are 
equivalent to: and utilizing the mathematical expectation, we obtain Iípi=E41(ab). Therefore, we have 
E+  fi pk=-,  vi, 
k=,ki  abpi 
and  substituting into (19)  and calculating xBi(Oi), we  see that  the conditions in  part  (a) are 
necessary and sufficient for x*(.) being an interior optimal performance function. On the other 
hand, the values pi defined above exist from assumptions. 
For xC1(.), we can use a similar argument because xC'(  m)  has to be a solution of program 
CIP'  (which coincides with VP' when A=O).  The part (a) holds. 
In order to prove the part (b),  suppose xCIi(B) 2 x*,(B) vi. Then, by the part (a), we 
obtain EOIpC1i 2  E41pi Vi. This implies (EO)"ITIpai  2 (w)"/IIpi  which is equivalent to 
@O)"-' 2 (Eb)"'  contradicting n 2  2.  O 
The intuition is the following. In principie, the principal can decrease the informational 
rent of an agent by reducing his performance. But given the supposed virtual income, if  he 
decreases the performance asked for an agent, preserving the income level, he has to increase 
the performances asked for other agents and this implies a rise of their informational rents. 
Corollary 3 shows that the principal prefers increase the solicited performance, in relation 
to the one of complete information, for a very efficient agent in order to decrease informational 
rents of others less efficient agents. 6.- CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we study an adverse selection model, with a principal and several agents, 
where contracting is under asymmetric information. The agents' number is finite and types are 
"continuous" and  independent. We analyze two  settings.  In  the first  one,  the performance 
functions of  mechanisms  may  depend  on  al1  the reported  types.  In  the  second  one,  each 
performance function depends only on the respective announced type. 
Our first setting represents situations where an  economic agent (the principal) proposes 
personalized  take-it-or-leave-it  "prices"  and  "quantities"  to  another  agents,  so  that  each 
individual "menu" of contracts depends on every announced type.  Think of a firm purchasing 
an input, which is unfamiliar with the suppliers' productivity. Another example is the regulation 
of a good produced by an oligopoly with hidden efficiencies or the regulation of a monopolist 
with several independent divisions (or of a group of firms), each one producing a different good. 
Such  a  menu  of  contracts  may  represent  also,  for instante,  several classes of  managerial 
compensations. 
Under the standard hypotheses in the basic one-agent adverse selection model and the 
independence assumption,  there  is  not  loss  of  generality  if  the  principal  considers  only 
mechanisms for which every agent reports his true type as a dominant strategy. The former 
"equivalente" between the Bayesian implementation and the dominant strategy one stands firm 
in some cases, although the utility function of each agent is not monotone in his type. 
Supposing that theprincipal's "virtual income" depends on fhe agents' performances only 
through the aggregate total performance (which is natural in the context of regulation of the good 
produced by an oligopoly), unlike the standard properties of the optimal mechanisms in the basic 
one-agent adverse selection model, in our model the optimal mechanism may ask very efficient 
agents for an individual performance higher than the one of complete information. The intuition 
is that the principal "saves" informational rent of an agent inducing the truthful revelation of 
others  agent's  types.  In  the  frame of  regulation of  a  monopolist with  several independent 
divisions (or the one of a group of firms), each one producing a different good, when goods are 
substitutes the optimal regulatory mechanism may ask the most efficient divisions (or firms) for 
an individual production higher than the one of complete information. Nevertheless, when goods 
are complements, al1 individual production is lower than the one of complete information. The 
explanation is that, when goods are substitutes, informational rents and marginal social values of goods go in  opposite direetions: if the production of a good decreases, the marginal social 
value of  the other goods increases and  the optimal distortion, with  regard  to  the complete 
information solution, has to make a trade-off between the reductions in rent of divisious. 
Regarding the agents'  ex ante optimal number (which in the frame of regulation of  the 
private good produced by an oiigopoly would represent an ex ante limit on the regulated firms' 
number), when agents are symmetncal, tbe principal may prefer ex ante to hire more than one 
agent because the distribution of  the agents'  virtual costs improves with  the agent's  number, 
according to the ñrst order stochastic dominante. 
The second setting, where feasihle mechanisms have each individual performance based 
only on the type reported by the respective agent, is justifiable under two conditions which are 
verified in plenty of economic situations:  contracts depending on  performances are the only 
feasible,  and  every  agent  takes  a  hidden  action, after privately  observing  his  type,  which 
determines univocally his performance. Conclusions in this second setting are similar to the ones 
of the first setting. Appendix 1: Proof of  Lema  2 
By  the integral operator properties, each program [P(T,)] is equivalent to the following  - 
ones. Note that there is one for each vaiue of  O,:  if 7¡=Oi  we consider only the fist program, 
whereas if ri=4, oniy the second one. 
For each Oi  E E, T,[: 
- 
[%i;  d1  max  T[x,(. ,o,);o,,TJ 
xi(. ,@J  s.t.  G[xi(-,0i);Oi,7J r  O  - 
for each Oi  E Iri, gil: 
[P(oi;7JI  max  T[xi(- ,OJ;Oi,~i] 
xi(. Ji)  s.t.  G[xi(.  -  ,0J;Oi,7J  2 O 
The functionals S[  ;@,,T~],  E[.  ;Oi,ri], G[-  ;Oi,7,],  C3[.  ;Oi,7i], are defined on the space Zi 
of bounded and contiiuously differentiable  aimost everywhere functions from O.,  to R (extending 
in a differentiable fashion functions Wi and pi for xSO), in the following manner: 
It is easy to show that Gateaux differentials of the above functionals are linear in their 
increments. 
Differentiable extension of Wi and pi can be chosen such that the following inequalities 
hold: 
w,(x)  - p,(oi;B,) pi(x)  < wi(xej  - pi(oi;ij Vi(~*i)  v 8,  E e,,  v x  O 
Wi(x) - &(Oi;&)  pi(x) < Wi(x'J  - &(Oi;&) pi(x*,)  tl 0,  E  Bi, V x  5  O 
Any  solution of program @(Oi;7,)] must be strictly positive on some subset of positive 
measure in O.,.  If a solution was negative almost everywhere, the objective function vaiue would  - 
be lower than Wi(xei) - Pi(Oi;BJ pi(x"J. As p,(x*J  > pi(0), the constant functionai equal to xei 
would be feasible for the program with an  objective function value lower than the one of the 
solution: a contradiction. 
Thus,  every  solution  of  @(O,;TJ] has  to  be  a  regular  point  for  the  constraint 
6[xi(. ,@,);O,,T,]  2  0 [according to definition in Luenberger (1969), page 2481. An anaiogous argument, taking into account pi(x4J  <-qi'@),  qi"  <O,  may be applied 
for F(oi;7i)],  -  and therefore each one of its solutions is a regular point. 
Using the generalized Kuhn-Tucker theorem lpage 249 of Luenberger (1969)],  we have  - 
that  given  a  solution  xi(.,OJ  of  [P(oi;7i)] there  is  ~~(0~~7~)  2  O  such  that  the  associated 
Lagrangian: 
?[Z(-);O~,T~I  + a(Oj,7J  G[Z(-);O,,T~I 
is stationary at xi(.  ,@J.  This implies that the equality: 
holds for each solution xi(.  ,Oi) and then, we get 
for ali solution. Since Wi'(-)  1 vi'(.)  is strictly decreasing, any solution of  @O,;TJ]  has to be 
aimost everywhere constant (independent on types O ). 
With a similar line of argument, we can prove that any solution of program p(Oi;7J]  is 
a.e.  constant with regard to types 0$. 
We have just  shown, then, that  the above programs can  be reduced,  without loss of 
generality, defining them on the real number space (with xi E  BE).  Let si(-)  and  &(a)  be the 
continuously differentiable, strictly decreasing and positive functions which are unique solutions 
respectively of 
These functions exist by the properties of Wi  and pi because moreover we have o,(-  ;  a) >  O.  On 
the other hand, we have Pi(. ;ii)  > @,(e ;&)  and this implies si  (e)  < $i (-).  - 
Therefore, the unique solutions of programs p(Oi;rJ]  and [z(Oi;ri)]  are, respectively: 
- 
,(Oi;rJ: = maxl bi(0J,  pi(7J  1,  %(Oi;7J = mint +i  (O ), pi(ri)  1 
and, thus, the only solution of program [P(q)]  is:  - 
xX6;rJ = Zj(Oi;7J  if  Oi  E a,  T¡[,  xi(B;7J = 3(Oi;rJ if  Oi  E  Iri, Oi]. 
We can prove easily that the properties of Lemma 2 hold. O Appendix 2: Proof of the properties of the Example 
When f(r) =  110; 0 <  T <  0, we have d>(~)  =2~,  G,(a) =  1-(1-al2P)'  for a E  [0,2P]. The 
principal's  expected utility hiring n agents will be: 
-  --  (a -  c)"  2(n-i)! 
+n@uPm  1 -n(q(e)+u) = 
4 




1  We prove easiiy that  a,V  > O,  a,V  < O,  a,,V  1 .=, = u, anVl  ,=,  = 0, and then, the properties 
(a) and (b) of the example hold. 
Let n'  denote the function satisfying 9(a,c,B,u,n')  =O,  where 
From the implicit function theorem, we get that n* is continuously differentiable. 
As a,~  < O,  a,~  = -a,q  > O,  a,q  < O,  and a,p  > O (if n22)  relations a,n*  = 
-a,q/a,(p  > O,  a,n"  = -a,pIa,cp  < o, aun*  =-a,(pla.<p  < O,  a,n*  = -a,co/a,~ > o (if n'  22) 
hold. 
Finally, given B(a,c,P,u): = V(a,c,B,n') - (*(O)+u)ne  we have a,B=a,V(a,c,O,n*)  < O.  U 
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